In our country, the Airborne Forces enjoy well-deserved respect and unfading glory. Not everyone falls to serve in them, but those who felt the power of the military brotherhood of "Uncle Vasya's troops" will never forget about it. But even among the Airborne Forces, intelligence is something special. Scouts in the airborne troops are honored more than others, since the lives of all the soldiers participating in the operation often depend on their work.
Features of the reconnaissance units of the Airborne Forces
In Soviet times, military doctrine prescribed the participation of landing troops in offensive operations. In them, the elite of the Airborne Forces, intelligence, was supposed to provide only a more or less "smooth" landing, with minimal losses of personnel.
The tasks were assigned to them by the commander-in-chief of the district to which the corresponding unit was seconded. It was this person who was responsible for obtaining reliable and timely intelligence data. The headquarters of the Airborne Forces could order everything, up to spacepictures of the proposed landing areas, full descriptions of the captured objects (up to floor plans). GRU specialists were directly responsible for providing this data.
When did the fighters of the Airborne Forces get down to business? Intelligence began to work only after the landing, and supplied information exclusively to its units. And here we come to the most important thing: the Airborne Forces did not have an operational (!) intelligence service, no matter how paradoxical it may sound. This played a cruel joke on the paratroopers: when their units began to participate in local conflicts in the 80s, it immediately became clear that the current organization was no good.
Difficulty getting information
Just imagine: practically all operational information (route, armament, equipment of the enemy) intelligence (!) received in the central apparatus of the KGB, in the internal troops and even in the Ministry of Internal Affairs! Of course, in this state of affairs, no one was surprised by either poorly confirmed data or delays in receiving them, and behind-the-scenes intrigues spoiled the landing party a lot of blood …
Having suffered all the necessary information, the group flew to the landing site, studied the current situation on the spot, and immediately marked the route. Only after that did the data go to the commanders, on whom the intelligence of the Airborne Forces depended. The “bats” from the GRU helped their colleagues as much as possible, but their capabilities were not unlimited: some specific information could only be obtained by the paratroopers themselves.
It often happened that intelligence took the rap for themselves and for the main parts: they did notthey only paved the way for the group, but also constantly entered into fire contacts with the militants (which in itself is unacceptable under such conditions), made sure that they did not arrange provocations, literally “by the hand” escorted units of both the Airborne Forces and and other military branches.
Due to high losses and unwillingness to perform such specific tasks in the early 90s, a separate battalion was created, which was tasked with performing operational intelligence activities. The same period includes the creation of all the necessary "infrastructure" necessary for the successful implementation of the tasks set by the command.
About technical equipment
How, technically, were the airborne troops equipped? Intelligence did not have anything particularly outstanding: for example, in Afghanistan, specialists had to make do with ordinary binoculars and artillery compasses. Only there they received some types of radar stations, which were designed to detect moving targets, as well as laser rangefinders. It should be noted that Western intelligence officers have been using these "modern" devices for a very long time, which Afghan proved in many respects. Airborne reconnaissance in action is a terrible force, but the number of losses in a collision with a better equipped enemy was still great.
A series of portable direction finders: "Aqualung-R/U/K" became a real gift. Unlike previously used equipment of this kind, this equipment made it possible to reliably detect radiation sources, the fighters got the opportunityguaranteed interception of enemy communications on HF and VHF waves, as well as on frequencies traditionally used by airborne reconnaissance. Bats, the GRU special forces, also highly appreciated this technique.
Veterans recall that this technique has provided invaluable assistance in detecting bandit groups and gangs, which, before the adoption of "Aqualungs", very often went along secret paths. The army command finally managed to convince the party elite to give the order to start creating a special reconnaissance vehicle designed specifically for the Airborne Forces, but the collapse of the Union prevented these plans from coming to fruition. In principle, the fighters were also satisfied with the Rheostat machine used until that time, which had good technical equipment.
The problem was that no weapons were placed on it, since initially it was intended for completely different purposes that the airborne intelligence was not interested in. The Afghan once again proved that all (!) military equipment must have a standard weapon.
What you didn't get
Despite the fact that the Afghan campaign clearly showed the vital need to equip reconnaissance units with weapons with laser target designation, it did not appear in the Airborne Forces (however, as in the entire SA). In fact, active army testing of such weapons began in the Union from the mid-80s, but there was one subtlety here. The fact is that “homing” does not mean the presence of intelligence in a rocket: guidance is carried out according to a laser “pointer”, which is corrected from the ground or water. Scouts were the perfect candidatesto work with laser spotters, but our army never got them.
Paratroopers (as well as simple infantry, however) often had to master aviation "jargon". So it was possible to direct attack aircraft and helicopters much more accurately at the target, using a conventional radio. And they themselves did not want to fall under "friendly" fire at all. The Americans were already different then: they had means of indicating targets, which, in a truly automatic mode, having received data from ground services, could direct combat aircraft and helicopters to the target.
The well-equipped Iraqi troops were completely defeated during the "Desert Storm": US troops simply "stacked" missiles with precise guidance on their tanks. At the same time, there was practically no risk, but Iraq was almost immediately left without heavy armored vehicles. Our deep intelligence of the Airborne Forces could only envy them.
Chechen weekdays
While in Afghanistan, intelligence was at the very least engaged in really core activities, in Chechnya the fighters again became "generalists": often they had to not only detect, but also destroy militants. There was a chronic shortage of specialists, many types of troops had neither equipment nor trained fighters at all, and therefore the Airborne Forces (intelligence in particular) were officially reprofiled to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage activities.
Fortunately, by 1995, the recruitment of the 45th Special Purpose Regiment (which became a real legend) was almost completed. The uniqueness of thisunits in that when it was created, the experience of all foreign armies was not only studied, but also actively used in practice. Taking into account the lessons of Afghanistan, the prepared groups were immediately trained not only for reconnaissance, but also for direct fire clashes with the enemy.
For this, the 45th regiment immediately received the required amount of medium and heavy armored vehicles. In addition, the paratroopers finally got "Nona" - unique mortar and artillery systems that allow firing shells with "honest" homing ("Kitolov-2").
Finally, in the intelligence units of other regiments of the Airborne Forces (military intelligence in this respect has gone far ahead), finally, line departments were created. To equip them, BTR-80s were transferred, which were used only as reconnaissance vehicles (there were no fighters in the airborne squad), AGS crews (automatic grenade launchers) and flamethrower systems were actively prepared and coordinated.
The difficulty was in another. Our fighters immediately began to say that the intelligence of the Airborne Forces of Ukraine (from selected nationalists) was participating in the war on the side of the militants. Since only specialists trained the fighters, even friends often met in battle.
Why all this was done
All these activities made it possible to quickly prepare for the exits of the group, prepared and equipped to perform combat missions in difficult mountainous terrain. Moreover, these units had a sufficient amount of heavy weapons, which made it possible, upon detection of largeclusters of the enemy not only to report on their deployment, but also to independently engage in battle. Armor, on the other hand, often came to the rescue of scouts who suddenly encountered superior enemy forces.
It was the experience of the landing troops that gave impetus to the re-equipment of the reconnaissance units of other military branches, which also received heavy armored vehicles. The fact is that the intelligence of the Airborne Forces in action proved that a couple of armored personnel carriers can greatly improve the effectiveness of military operations.
Drones
It was in the 45th regiment for the first time in our history that combat tests of UAVs began, which are now a real "hit" among the same Americans. The domestic drone appeared far from out of nowhere: since the late 80s, there has been an active development of the Stroy-P reconnaissance complex, the main “olfactory sense” of which was to be the Pchela-1T aircraft.
Unfortunately, before the start of the war, he was never brought to mind, since the landing method was not thought out. But already in April, the first "Stroy-P" went to Khankala. Five “Bees” were attached to it at once. Tests immediately proved the highest efficiency of such weapons in modern wars. So, it was possible to tie to the map all the identified positions of the militants with an accuracy of literally up to a centimeter, which was immediately appreciated by the gunners.
Difficulties of operation
A total of 18 launches were made, and all of them were made in the mountains, in which the military intelligence of the Airborne Forces was forced to act most often. The military immediately had complaints about the undercarriage of the "Bee". However, the technicians were ableto achieve satisfactory operation of the engines, after which the depth of exploration immediately increased to 50 kilometers or more.
Unfortunately, the difficulties of the 90s led to the fact that only 18 Pchela-1T devices were in service throughout the country. Ten of them were stored at the base of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea, where tests were carried out to launch them from the deck of ships. Alas, they were not treated well there: the design bureaus had to work hard to bring the Bees to a conditioned state after they were stored in inappropriate conditions.
In the end, 15 vehicles began flying in the Chechen mountains. By that time, two had been lost in combat, and one "Chernomorets" could not be restored.
Gold or drones
Initially, it was planned that at least a hundred such devices would be in service with the Airborne Forces intelligence throughout the country. The joyful military immediately handed over all the technical documentation for their production to the Smolensk Aviation Plant. The labor proletarians immediately disappointed them: even according to the most modest estimates, unmanned vehicles turned out to be almost more expensive than gold.
Because of this, the production was abandoned. The other 15 vehicles served the scouts well: they were taken to the design bureau to be restored, launched again and invariably received the most accurate information that the landing force could not always get. The Airborne Forces reconnaissance is very grateful to the developers of the Bee, as hardworking machines have saved many lives.
Spies-propagandists
Alas,but the intelligence command was by no means always able to correctly use all the means that were at its disposal. So, at one time, at least five dozen people, specialists in "psychological operations", were transferred to Mozdok. They had at their disposal a mobile printing house and a receiving-transmitting television center. With the help of the latter, the intelligence services planned to broadcast propaganda materials.
But the command did not foresee that full-time specialists could provide television broadcasting, but there were no operators and correspondents in the detachment. With leaflets, everything turned out even worse. They turned out to be so bad in content and appearance that they caused only despondency. In general, the position of specialists in psychological work turned out to be not very popular among intelligence officers.
Logistics and supply issues
Starting from the first campaign, the disgusting equipment of the reconnaissance groups of the Airborne Forces (and other military branches too) began to affect, contributing to an increase in injuries and an increase in the risk of detection. As a result, the paratroopers had to recruit veterans who raised funds to equip their fellow soldiers. Alas, the Second Chechen War was characterized by exactly the same problems. So, in 2008, the Union of Paratroopers raised money for comfortable unloading, imported boots, sleeping bags, and even for medical supplies…
How the training of the Airborne Forces has changed since Soviet times
Bunlike in previous years, the command began to pay much more attention to the training of small reconnaissance and combat groups. It has finally become clear that in modern conditions they are much more important than divisions. Simply put, the role of individual training of each fighter has sharply increased, which is simply vital for scouts, since each of them can rely solely on their own strength in a combat output.
What remains unchanged is the airborne intelligence chevrons: they depict a bat (like the GRU). In 2005, a decree was issued that ordered all intelligence departments to switch to a chevron with an image of an eagle clutching a carnation and a black arrow in its paws, but so far there has been little progress in this direction. Of course, the form of reconnaissance of the Airborne Forces has also completely changed: it has become much more convenient, it has regular unloading.
Compliance of intelligence of the Airborne Forces with modern realities
Experts say the situation is not very rosy today. Of course, the rearmament process that has begun is encouraging, but the technical equipment does not reach generally accepted standards.
Thus, among the Americans, up to ¼ of the personnel of a division of any kind of troops are specifically reconnaissance. Our share of personnel who can engage in such operations is, at best, 8-9%. The difficulty is also in the fact that earlier there were separate reconnaissance battalions in which first-class specialists were trained. Now there are only specialized companies, the level of training of personnel in which is far from being so high.
Like herehit
And how to get into the intelligence of the Airborne Forces? First, each candidate must pass a standard medical examination for fitness for military service. The state of he alth must correspond to category A1 (A2 as a last resort).
It will not be superfluous to file a report addressed to the military commissar of the recruiting station from where you intend to go to pay your debt to the Motherland. On all subsequent commissions, also voice your desire. In the meantime, information about your desire to serve in the intelligence of the Airborne Forces will appear in your file. At the assembly point, try to make personal contact with the "buyers" from the paratroopers.
As soon as you arrive at the place of service, file a report addressed to the unit commander with a request to transfer you to the reconnaissance company. It is important to withstand further screening, which is done by passing a fairly tough physical fitness exam. The competition is high. The requirements for candidates are extremely high. We note right away that it is necessary to find out about them before being drafted into the army, since the standards change quite often.
Do not forget about the psychological tests designed to identify those fighters who can really serve in such a specific branch of the military, which is the intelligence department of the Airborne Forces. And these checks should be taken extremely seriously: "closing your eyes", they will not look at their results here. Only a person who is brave enough, smart enough and can be extremely cold-blooded in a deadly situation is worthy of enrollment inreconnaissance division. And further. Preference is given to those candidates who have a VAS. In addition, people who have a civilian speci alty that could be useful (signallers, electronics engineers) are highly rated.
Do not forget about contract service in intelligence. As is the case with many of the most important branches of the military (border guards in particular), preference is now given to those soldiers who have served their military service in the same troops where they apply for enrollment on a contract. Here's how to get into the airborne intelligence.
